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COMMENTS
SUMMARY EXHIBITS AND THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: LOOKING
BEYOND THE HEARSAY RULE FOR
EVIDENTIARY IMPLICATIONS OF
CRAWFORD’S PROGENY
Karim Basaria*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Confrontation Clause provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.”1 This right is afforded to defendants in criminal cases by giving them
the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who testify against them.
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the purpose of the Confrontation
Clause is to “ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal
defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary
proceeding before the trier of fact.”2 However, before the Court’s 2004
decision in Crawford v. Washington, criminal defendants were not
guaranteed an opportunity to cross-examine a witness’s out-of-court
statement against them if the statement fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay
exception” or was otherwise considered reliable.3 Crawford effectively
severed the relationship between the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause and the hearsay rule, holding that a defendant’s right to
confrontation can only be satisfied when the defendant has the opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses against him.4
*
J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2012; B.S. in Accounting and Finance,
University of Illinois at Chicago, 2006.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990).
3
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 66 (1980)).
4
Id. at 59.
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After Crawford, the Court has made numerous attempts to
categorically distinguish statements that trigger the confrontation right from
statements that do not. Most of Crawford’s progeny have attempted to
distinguish “testimonial” statements, which trigger Confrontation Clause
protections under the new standard, from “non-testimonial” statements,
which do not receive constitutional scrutiny.5 More recently, the Court has
begun to address how and whether Crawford’s progeny dictate which
witnesses the government must call when confronting criminal defendants
with their accusers.6 The Supreme Court has yet to address whether charts,
summaries, and calculations of voluminous data are testimonial. Such
evidence is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 1006.
However, if this evidence is testimonial, the fact that it is admissible under
FRE 1006 should not protect it from Sixth Amendment scrutiny. Under
Crawford, the Confrontation Clause should prohibit the admission of a
testimonial summary exhibit unless the defendant is given the opportunity
to cross-examine the individuals whose assertions are contained in the
summary evidence. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the
Court’s decision in Crawford, which effectively segregated the
determination of evidentiary admissibility from the determination of
constitutional admissibility.
As courts continue to define the contours of the Sixth Amendment, the
same concerns that led the Court to sever the hearsay rule from the
Confrontation Clause will eventually require it to address whether the
admission of testimonial summary exhibits raises Confrontation Clause
concerns when the defendant is not afforded the opportunity to confront the
individuals who made the assertions contained in the summaries.
Part II of this Comment contains a brief history of our Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence. Part II also provides a general overview of FRE
1006, which allows for the admissibility of summary exhibits. The right to
confrontation can be traced back to long before the founding of this
country. However, recent developments in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
have significantly expanded the scope of the right. Part III of this Comment
explores the relationship between FRE 1006, the hearsay regime, and the
Confrontation Clause. A summary exhibit can be testimonial in the same
way certain hearsay statements are testimonial. This section of the
5
See, e.g., Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828–29
(2006).
6
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710 (holding that the Confrontation Clause is violated where
the prosecution introduces a forensic lab report through the in-court testimony of an analyst
who did not sign the certification or personally perform or observe the performance of the
test reported in the certification).
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Comment discusses why courts should subject testimonial summary
exhibits to the same degree of constitutional scrutiny as testimonial hearsay
evidence. In Part IV, this Comment explores how the Supreme Court’s
fractured decision in Williams v. Illinois7 has confounded the Court’s
otherwise steady Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, and how that decision
could impact whether summary exhibits receive constitutional scrutiny.
Part V provides a conclusion to this Comment, asserting that the admission
of testimonial summary exhibits without the right to cross-examination
violates the Confrontation Clause under Crawford.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE BEFORE CRAWFORD

A defendant’s right to face his accuser has its roots in Roman law.
The Roman governor Porcius Festus famously said of his prisoner, Paul the
Apostle, “[i]t is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die,
before that he which is accused have the accusers face to face, and have
license to answer for himself concerning the crime laid against him.” 8 In
English common law, the tragic story of Sir Walter Raleigh is often cited to
illustrate the importance of being able to face one’s accusers.9
In the United States, the right to confrontation has been codified in the
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution. “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.”10 The Roman and traditional English models differ from the Sixth
Amendment in that the former provide only the right to face one’s accuser,
while the latter provides the right to face not only one’s accuser, but also
any adverse witnesses.11 The Supreme Court held in Pointer v. Texas that
the confrontation right applied to the states through the Fourteenth

7

132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
Acts 25:16 (King James); see also id. at 23:35 (“I will hear thee, said he, when thine
accusers are also come. And he commanded him to be kept in Herod’s judgment hall.”).
9
See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. Sir Walter Raleigh was accused of treason by Lord
Cobham, his alleged accomplice. Raleigh argued that Cobham lied to save himself and
demanded that he be brought forth. The judges denied Sir Walter Raleigh the opportunity to
confront Cobham, his accuser, and the jury convicted Raleigh, who was then sentenced to
death. Id.
10
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11
Another subtle but significant difference between Roman law and the Sixth
Amendment is the Sixth Amendment’s passive phrasing. Id. (“[T]he accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” (emphasis added)). The
passive phrasing makes clear that the burden is on the prosecution to produce those
witnesses.
8
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Amendment.12 Before Crawford, the Sixth Amendment and the hearsay
rule “dealt with the problem of the reliability of second-hand evidence in
much the same way.”13 Secondhand statements offered against criminal
defendants were presumed reliable if they fell within a “firmly rooted
hearsay exception.”14 If a firmly rooted hearsay exception applied, the
confrontation right did not attach.15
The most recent articulation of this position was in the Supreme
Court’s 1980 decision, Ohio v. Roberts.16 In Roberts, the Court held that a
witness’s out-of-court statement may be admitted against a criminal
defendant without opportunity for cross-examination if the statement bears
adequate indicia of reliability.17 To meet that test, evidence had to either
fall within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bear “particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.”18
B. CRAWFORD AND ITS PROGENY

In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court overruled Roberts and
severed the Confrontation Clause from the hearsay rule,19 holding that the
confrontation right will no longer be satisfied simply because a statement
against the accused falls within a hearsay exception or bears “indicia of
reliability.”20 In Crawford, the defendant was tried for the assault and
attempted murder of a man who allegedly raped his wife.21 At trial, the
State played for the jury a tape-recorded statement that the defendant’s wife
made to the police.22 The defendant did not have the opportunity to crossexamine his wife because Washington’s marital privilege rule barred a
spouse from testifying without the other spouse’s consent.23 However,
12

380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
G. Michael Fenner, Today’s Confrontation Clause (After Crawford and MelendezDiaz), 43 CREIGHTON. L. REV. 35, 37 (2009).
14
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 65 (“The Court has applied this ‘indicia of reliability’ requirement principally by
concluding that certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of
virtually any evidence within them comports with the ‘substance of the constitutional
protection.’” (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895))).
18
Id. at 66.
19
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004) (“Where testimonial statements
are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection
to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of reliability.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
20
Id. at 68.
21
Id. at 38.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 40.
13
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privilege did not extend to a spouse’s out-of-court statements admissible
under a hearsay exception.24 This allowed the State to admit the taperecorded conversation by invoking a hearsay exception for statements
against penal interest.25
The defendant argued that—notwithstanding the state marital privilege
and evidence laws—admitting the taped statements would violate his Sixth
Amendment right to be “confronted with the witnesses against him.”26
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts, the trial court
admitted the statements over the defendant’s objections on the basis that the
defendant’s wife’s statements bore “particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.”27 The jury convicted the defendant of assault.28 On
appeal, Washington’s higher courts avoided the constitutional question,
instead deciding the case on whether the statements bore guarantees of
trustworthiness.29
In a watershed opinion, the Supreme Court overturned its decision in
Ohio v. Roberts, holding that while “the [Confrontation] Clause’s ultimate
goal is to ensure reliability of evidence . . . it is a procedural rather than a
substantive guarantee,”30 which can only be satisfied by providing the
accused an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him,
regardless of whether that witness’s statement falls within a hearsay
exception.31 Because the defendant in Crawford was not afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine his wife, the Court held that this right was
violated by the State when it played the tape-recorded account of the
stabbing.32
The result from Crawford was an “expanded . . . category of cases in
which the hearsay rules will allow—but the Confrontation Clause will
prohibit—the introduction of an out-of-court statement.”33 Justice Scalia,
who wrote the Crawford opinion, stated that it is not enough for the
statement to be reliable, but that this “reliability [needed to] be assessed in a
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”34
24

Id.
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 41.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 61.
31
Id. (“[The Confrontation Clause] commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of crossexamination.”).
32
Id. at 68–69.
33
David A. Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 5.
34
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
25
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According to Crawford, “the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy
constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes:
confrontation.”35
While Crawford marked the beginning of a much broader construction
of the Sixth Amendment, the Court placed an important limitation on the
types of statements that would be inadmissible without confrontation. The
defendant’s right to cross-examine applies only to “testimonial” statements
offered against the accused in a criminal prosecution to prove the truth of
the matter asserted.36 In other words, the right is not implicated when: (1)
the statement is being offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth of
its contents;37 (2) the statement is not offered in a criminal prosecution
against the accused;38 or (3) the statement is not testimonial.39
Because Crawford failed to lay out a comprehensive definition of
testimonial,40 the most difficult challenge in the post-Crawford
Confrontation Clause analysis has been the determination of whether a
statement is testimonial.
The Court’s first attempt to define testimonial after Crawford came in
the 2006 case of Davis v. Washington.41 In Davis, the Court articulated the
“primary purpose” test for determining whether a statement is testimonial
for Sixth Amendment purposes.42 Under this test, it does not matter who
made the statement, through what medium the statement was transmitted, or
to whom the statement was made.43 Whether the statement is testimonial
depends on why the statement was made. If the purpose of the statement
was to respond to an ongoing emergency, then the statement is nontestimonial.44 However, if the purpose of the statement was to further an
35

Id. at 69.
Id.
37
Id. at 59 n.9 (“The Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for
purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” (citing Tennessee v. Street,
471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985))). Examples include statements offered to demonstrate the effect
upon the listener, to impeach a prior inconsistent statement, and to provide context to nonhearsay evidence.
38
This limitation derives from the text of the Sixth Amendment itself: “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
39
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
40
Id. at 68. (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition
of ‘testimonial.’”). The Court acknowledged that a refusal to articulate a comprehensive
definition would cause uncertainty in the interim, but argued that such uncertainty could
hardly be any worse than the status quo under Roberts. Id. at 68 n.10.
41
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
42
Id. at 822.
43
Fenner, supra note 13, at 49–50.
44
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
36
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investigation for criminal prosecution, the statement is testimonial and the
declarant is subject to cross-examination.45 Other circumstantial facts, such
as the declarant, listener, and medium, are only relevant insofar as they shed
light on the primary purpose of the statement.46
Under this test, consecutive statements made by the same declarant to
the same listener may receive different treatment under the Sixth
Amendment if the purpose of the statement changes in the middle of the
conversation.47 In Davis, for example, statements made to a police officer
over a 911 call were held to be non-testimonial because they were made
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
statements was to enable the police to assist in an ongoing emergency. 48
Statements made minutes later to officers who secured the scene were held
to be testimonial because the primary purpose had shifted from addressing
the emergency to establishing or proving past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution.49 Davis made clear that the Court would not rely
on rigid classifications based on the identity of the speaker or listener, the
timing, or the mode of transmission to determine whether a statement is
testimonial.50 Instead, it would rely on these attributes to provide context in
order to determine the purpose of the statement.
In 2009, the Court’s opinion in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts51
marked a significant expansion in the scope of the Confrontation Clause. In
Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court held that a crime lab analyst’s
certificates were testimonial and that the defendant’s right to confrontation
was violated because he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the
lab analyst.52 In Melendez-Diaz, the defendant was arrested for the
possession of what appeared to be cocaine.53 The seized substance was
submitted to a state laboratory required by law to conduct chemical analysis
upon police request.54 At trial, the State submitted three “certificates of
45

Id.
Id.
47
Fenner, supra note 13, at 52.
48
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
49
Id. There is still some debate as to whose primary purpose should be considered when
determining whether a statement is testimonial. For an illuminating discussion on this, see
Fenner, supra note 13, at 52–59.
50
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (reaching its holding “without attempting to produce an
exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements”); see also United States v. Summers,
414 F.3d 1287, 1300 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court declined to rigidly define what
is meant by the term ‘testimonial.’”).
51
129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
52
Id. at 2542.
53
Id. at 2530.
54
Id.
46
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analysis” showing the results of the forensic analysis performed on the
seized substances.55 The certificates, which were sworn before a notary
public, reported the weight of the bags and stated that the substance in the
bags contained cocaine.56 The defendant objected to the admission of the
certificates, asserting that the Court’s decision in Crawford required the
analyst to testify and be cross-examined.57 The objection was overruled, the
certificates were admitted into evidence, and a jury found the defendant
guilty of distributing cocaine.58
On appeal, the defendant contended that the admission of the
certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.59 After the Appeals Court of Massachusetts rejected
the defendant’s claim and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied
review, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.60 In a 5-to-4 decision,
the Court held that the crime lab’s certificates were testimonial because
they were prepared in anticipation of criminal prosecution and were
“affidavits” against the defendant.61
Melendez-Diaz expanded the confrontation right by broadening the
meaning of the phrase “witnesses against him” in the Sixth Amendment.
The Court held that anyone providing testimonial evidence against the
defendant, including a crime lab analyst, is a “witness against” the accused
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.62 Now, in order to admit such
certificates, the government must demonstrate the analyst’s unavailability

55

Id. at 2531.
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 2532. There is a potential conflict between the primary purpose test articulated
in Davis and Melendez-Diaz. Many lab reports, autopsies, and DNA tests are not performed
with litigation in mind, and are therefore non-testimonial, even if those records later come to
be used in a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Sanders v. Commonwealth, 711 S.E.2d 213,
214, 219–20 (Va. 2011) (holding that the admission of a lab report indicating the victim
contracted sexually transmitted diseases did not violate the accused’s right to confrontation
because the report was created for medical treatment purposes rather than forensic
investigation purposes; the fact that the Commonwealth sought to use the report in a criminal
prosecution later did not change its non-testimonial character). This leads to the arguably
bizarre outcome of the same types of lab results, derived from the same set of tests,
conducted by the same analyst, using the same set of procedures, and with the same chances
of mistake, receiving different treatment even though the analyst is in both cases a “witness”
against the defendant.
62
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 2532.
56
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and show that the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.63
Otherwise, the defendant has the right to confront the analyst at trial.64
In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy—joined by Justice
Alito, Justice Breyer, and Chief Justice Roberts—argued that crime lab
analysts should not be considered witnesses for the purposes of the
Confrontation Clause.65 According to the dissent, crime lab analysts are not
witnesses in the traditional sense for three reasons. First, they do not recall
events they actually observed in the past, but instead make nearcontemporaneous observations.66 Second, crime lab analysts do not
observe a crime or any human action related to it.67 Third, they do not
provide statements in response to interrogation.68 The dissent also
expressed practicability concerns, arguing that the decision will impose a
significant burden on prosecutors while providing little substantive benefit
to criminal defendants.69 Critics of the Melendez-Diaz decision have
echoed these concerns and gone further to make slippery slope arguments,
questioning whether DNA analyses, breathalyzer tests, ballistic tests, and
autopsies will all eventually be enveloped by such a broad construction of
the confrontation right.70
In a recent Confrontation Clause decision, Bullcoming v. New
Mexico,71 the Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of testimonial
assertions where the maker of the assertions is someone other than the
person available for cross-examination by the defendant.72 In Bullcoming,
the defendant, Donald Bullcoming, was charged with and convicted of

63

Id. (“Absent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that
petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, petitioner was entitled to be
confronted with the analysts at trial.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
64
Id.
65
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2550–51 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
66
Id. at 2551.
67
Id. at 2552.
68
Id.
69
See id. at 2544. Justice Scalia responded to concerns over judicial economy in his
majority opinion: “Perhaps the best indication that the sky will not fall after today’s decision
is that . . . [m]any States have already adopted the constitutional rule we announce
today . . . [yet] there is no evidence that the criminal justice system has ground to a halt in
[these States].” Id. at 2540–41 (majority opinion).
70
Deborah L. Meyer, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts: What the Expanded
Confrontation Clause Ruling Means for Computer Forensics and Electronic Discovery, 28
TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 243, 272–73 (2009); Amber N. Gremillion, Note, I’ll Be
Seeing You in Court: Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts’ Flawed Decision and Its Impact on
Louisiana, 37 S.U. L. REV. 255, 271 (2010).
71
131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011), rev’g State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2010).
72
Id. at 2711.
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driving while intoxicated (DWI).73 The principal evidence against
Bullcoming was a forensic laboratory report certifying that his bloodalcohol concentration (BAC) was well above the threshold for aggravated
DWI.74 Because the scientist who performed the laboratory tests, Cutis
Caylor, was placed on unpaid leave before trial,75 the State proposed to
introduce Caylor’s findings as a business record through the testimony of
one of the lab’s other scientists, Gerasimos Razatos.76 Razatos had neither
participated in, observed, nor reviewed Caylor’s analysis.77
At Bullcoming’s trial, which took place before the Supreme Court
decided Melendez-Diaz,78 Bullcoming’s counsel objected to the State’s
proposal, arguing that without an opportunity to cross-examine Caylor, the
introduction of the lab report would violate Bullcoming’s Sixth Amendment
right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. 79 The trial court
overruled the objection and admitted the report as a business record.80 The
jury convicted Bullcoming of aggravated DWI, and the New Mexico Court
of Appeals affirmed.81 Bullcoming appealed to the New Mexico Supreme
Court.82
While the appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.83 In light of Melendez-Diaz, the New
Mexico Supreme Court held the lab reports produced at Bullcoming’s trial
qualified as testimonial evidence because they were “functionally identical
to live, in-court testimony, doing precisely what a witness does on direct
examination.”84 Nevertheless the court found that for two reasons, the
admission of the report did not violate the Confrontation Clause.85 First, the
court said that Caylor, the certifying analyst, was a “mere scrivener” who
“simply transcribed the results generated by the [lab equipment].”86
Second, the court found that although Razatos did not participate in testing
73

Id. at 2709.
Id.
75
Id. at 2711–12.
76
Id. at 2712.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. The trial judge noted that when he began practicing law, “there were no breath
tests or blood tests. They just brought in the cop, and the cop said, ‘Yeah, he was drunk.’”
Id. at 2712 n.3.
81
Id. at 2712.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 2713 (quoting State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 8–9 (N.M. 2010)).
74
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Bullcoming’s blood, he “qualified as an expert witness with respect to the
[lab equipment].”87 The New Mexico Supreme Court ultimately held that
“Bullcoming’s right of confrontation was preserved” because Razatos was
able to serve as a “surrogate” for Caylor.88
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the
Confrontation Clause permits the introduction of a testimonial forensic
laboratory report through the in-court testimony of an analyst who did not
sign the certification or personally perform or observe the performance of
the test reported in the certification.89 Divided along essentially the same
lines as the Melendez-Diaz Court,90 the Bullcoming Court held five to four
that “[a]s a rule, if an out-of-court statement is testimonial in nature, it may
not be introduced against the accused at trial unless the witness who made
the statement is unavailable and the accused has had a prior opportunity to
confront that witness.”91
At the outset, the Court rejected the notion that surrogate testimony
was adequate to satisfy Bullcoming’s confrontation right simply because
Caylor’s work involved routine tasks and reading output from a machine.92
According to the Court, the representations in Caylor’s report—that he
“received Bullcoming’s blood sample intact with the seal unbroken, that he
checked to make sure that the forensic report number and the sample
number corresponded, . . . that he performed on Bullcoming’s sample a
particular test, adhering to a precise protocol,” and that no circumstance or
condition affected the integrity of the sample or the validity of the
analysis—related to “past events and human actions [that are] not revealed
in raw, machine-produced data . . . .”93 Most witnesses, concluded the
Court, “testify to their observations of factual conditions or events.”94 This
includes witnesses who relay the output of instruments and mechanical
equipment.95 The Court concluded that to hold that a testimonial report
87

Id. (quoting Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 9).
Id. (quoting Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 10).
89
Id.
90
The prevailing opinion was joined by all of the Justices from the Melendez-Diaz
majority plus Justice Sotomayor, who replaced Justice Stevens; Justice Stevens was a part of
the majority in Melendez-Diaz. The same Justices who dissented in Melendez-Diaz—
Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Alito, and the Chief Justice—also dissented in Bullcoming.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 2714–15.
93
Id. at 2714.
94
Id.
95
The Court referred to observations such as “the light was green,” “the hour was noon,”
or the reading from a radar gun as examples. To illustrate its concern, the Court asked,
rhetorically, “[c]ould an officer other than the one who saw the number on the . . . [radar]
gun present the information in court—so long as that officer was equipped to testify about
88
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does not implicate the Sixth Amendment by virtue of it being drawn from
machine-produced data would be flatly inconsistent with Crawford’s
holding that “the obvious reliability of a testimonial statement does not
dispense with the Confrontation Clause.”96
The Supreme Court also rejected the state court’s second rationale for
admitting the BAC report, that Razatos could substitute for Caylor because
he qualified as an expert.97 “[S]urrogate testimony of the kind Razatos was
equipped to give,” according to the Court, “could not convey what Caylor
knew or observed about the events his certification concerned . . . .”98
Because Bullcoming’s counsel never had the opportunity to cross-examine
Caylor, Bullcoming was unable to probe the “particular test and testing
process he employed” or “expose any lapses or lies on [his] part.”99 The
Court also noted that Bullcoming’s counsel was unable to ask “questions
designed to reveal whether incompetence, evasiveness, or dishonesty”
accounted for Caylor being placed on unpaid leave.100 This, according to
the Court, constituted a deprivation of Bullcoming’s Sixth Amendment
right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him.” 101 As the Court
continues to define the scope and meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the
focus of its inquiries has primarily been whether statements that would have
been admissible under either a hearsay exception or statutory provision in
the pre-Crawford era are now inadmissible due to confrontation
concerns.102
Though Crawford fundamentally transformed Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence, it did not contemplate the type of witness who would present
a summary exhibit. However, in light of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, a
challenge to the admissibility of testimonial summary exhibits without
confrontation could be successful.

any technology the observing officer deployed and the police department’s standard
operating procedures?” Id. at 2714–15.
96
Id. at 2715 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004)).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 2716.
102
See e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009) (concerning
lab reports originally admissible pursuant to state law as “prima facie evidence of the
composition, quality, and net weight of the narcotic . . . analyzed”); Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006) (holding that the admission of statements under the present sense
impression exception was a violation of the defendant’s confrontation right where the
defendant did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the witness who made the
statements).
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C. SUMMARY EXHIBITS, GENERALLY

According to Federal Rule of Evidence 1006:
The proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of
voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently
examined in court. The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs
which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a
chart, summary, or calculation. The proponent must make the originals or duplicates
available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time
103
and place. And the court may order the proponent to produce them in court.

The language of the rule sets forth four requirements for the admission of
summaries.
First, the materials underlying the summary must be
voluminous; second, the summary itself must be accurate and authentic;
third, the underlying materials must be admissible;104 and fourth, the
underlying materials must be made available to the opposing party within a
reasonable amount of time. Additionally, courts are in agreement that
summary exhibits may only be used to summarize evidence in the form of
writings, recordings, and photographs, and that they may not be used to
summarize testimony from the instant case in lieu of presenting the
testimony itself.105 A summary exhibit must also be properly introduced
into evidence through a sponsoring witness who supervised its
preparation.106
Summary exhibits are used in a variety of cases, including fraud,107 tax
evasion,108 drug conspiracy,109 theft,110 murder,111 and white-collar criminal
cases,112 among others.113 Summary exhibits are especially appropriate
103

FED. R. EVID. 1006. The language of FRE 1006 was amended effective December
2011. Per the commentary to amendment, “[t]hese changes are intended to be stylistic only.
There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.”
104
See, e.g., Peat, Inc. v. Vanguard Research, Inc., 378 F.3d 1154, 1160 (11th Cir. 2004)
(“Rule 1006 is not a back-door vehicle for the introduction of evidence which is otherwise
inadmissible.”). The party offering the summary need not offer the underlying data into
evidence. See, e.g., Air Safety, Inc. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Bos., 94 F.3d 1, 7
n.14 (1st Cir. 1996); Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 41 F.3d 182,
189 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 736 (4th Cir. 1991)).
105
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1156 (4th Cir. 1995).
106
United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 545 (6th Cir. 2008).
107
United States v. Loney, 959 F.2d 1332, 1336–37 (5th Cir. 1992) (wire fraud); United
States v. Bentley, 825 F.2d 1104, 1108–09 (7th Cir. 1987) (mail fraud); United States v.
Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 816 (11th Cir. 1984) (Medicare fraud).
108
United States v. Howard, 774 F.2d 838, 843–44 (7th Cir. 1985).
109
United States v. Possick, 849 F.2d 332, 339 (8th Cir. 1988).
110
United States v. Ollison, 555 F.3d 152, 162 (5th Cir. 2009).
111
State v. Skatzes, 819 N.E.2d 215, 250 (Ohio 2004).
112
United States v. Fullwood, 342 F.3d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 204–05 (3d Cir. 1992).
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where the underlying material is in the nature of financial records, accounts,
business transactions, or other records of a detailed or complicated
nature.114 Of course, the operation of FRE 1006 is not confined to such
material and summaries have been admitted to explain other types of
evidence as well.115
It is important to understand the difference between summary exhibits
admitted under FRE 1006 and demonstrative or pedagogical summaries
admitted under FRE 611(a).116 While some courts have acknowledged that
the distinctions are not always clear,117 the Sixth Circuit has explained that
there are three classes of summary exhibits: (1) FRE 1006 “primary
evidence summaries,” which are exhibits where the summary itself, not the
underlying documents, is evidence to be considered by the fact finder; (2)
purely “pedagogical summaries” under FRE 611(a), which are intended to
summarize, clarify, or simplify other evidence admitted in the case, but
which are not themselves admitted; and (3) “secondary evidence
summaries,” which are a combination of the first two, in that they are not
prepared entirely for compliance with FRE 1006, but are more than mere
pedagogical devices designed to simplify and clarify other evidence.118
113

See, e.g., United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2009) (bribery); United
States v. Leon-Reyes, 177 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 1999) (perjury); United States v. Mass. Mar.
Acad., 762 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1985) (asbestos litigation).
114
See, e.g., United States v. Stoecker, 215 F.3d 788, 792 (7th Cir. 2000) (admitting
charts summarizing pledges of single groups of stock as security for loans from banks);
Fagiola v. Nat’l Gypsum Co. AC & S., 906 F.2d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 1990) (admitting summary
of sales of asbestos products based on thirty-year-old fragmentary sales documents); Kroll v.
United States, 433 F.2d 1282, 1289–90 (5th Cir. 1970) (admitting charts summarizing
business records of a mortgage company).
115
See, e.g., United States v. Atchley, 699 F.2d 1055, 1059 (11th Cir. 1983) (invoking
FRE 1006 in approving receipt in evidence of chart summarizing telephone toll records);
Nichols v. Upjohn Co., 610 F.2d 293, 293–94 (5th Cir. 1980) (admitting testimonial
summary of investigative findings set out in 94,000-page new drug application).
116
FED. R. EVID. 611(a). The rule directs courts to “exercise reasonable control over the
mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make those
procedures effective for determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.” Though the rule does not address
pedagogical summaries specifically, Rule 611(a) is considered the basis for their admission.
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1157 (4th Cir. 1995).
117
United States v. Swanquist, 161 F.3d 1064, 1072–73 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Wood, 943 F.2d 1048, 1053–54 (9th Cir. 1991).
118
United States v. Bray, 139 F.3d 1104, 1112 (6th Cir. 1998); see also James Lockhart,
Annotation, Admissibility of Summaries or Charts of Writings, Recordings, or Photographs
Under Rule 1006 of Federal Rules of Evidence, 198 A.L.R. FED. 427, § 2(b) (2004) (“Courts
have often stressed the need to distinguish Fed. R. Evid. 1006 ‘factual’ or ‘evidentiary’
summaries from ‘demonstrative’ or ‘pedagogical’ summaries; although they have also
pointed out that the distinction is not always clear, since it is possible for the material
actually proffered to be more in the nature of a ‘hybrid’ serving both functions.”).
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FRE 1006 summaries are different from FRE 611(a) demonstrative aids not
because of the contents of the exhibits themselves, but rather because of the
purposes they are intended to serve.119 Exhibits intended to be evidentiary
substitutes for voluminous materials are admissible under FRE 1006.
Summaries designed to be only illustrative should be admitted under FRE
611(a).120
Demonstrative aids under FRE 611(a) are not subject to the criteria
listed in FRE 1006.121 This gives the proponents of demonstrative aids
more latitude with the information they place in exhibits. Proponents of
demonstrative aids need not establish the admissibility of the underlying
data, and are usually provided more leeway to include inferences drawn
from the underlying data that would be inadmissible under FRE 1006.122
Nevertheless, the proponent of a demonstrative aid is somewhat limited in
the extent of the inferences that may be drawn and the amount of emphasis
that can be placed on specific information.123 Demonstrative aids are also
limited in that they may not reflect evidence not admitted at trial.124
In contrast, FRE 1006 summaries not only serve as vehicles to provide
the jury with succinct presentations of otherwise complex evidence, they
also are, unlike demonstrative exhibits under FRE 611(a), accepted as
substantive evidence themselves.125 While this distinction is important,
there may admittedly be little difference, from the jury’s perspective,
between a summary admitted as substantive evidence under FRE 1006 and
a demonstrative or pedagogical aid that summarizes and clarifies testimony.
The court may provide a limiting instruction informing the jury that a
demonstrative summary under FRE 611(a) is not itself evidence,126 but
there is doubt as to whether juries are able to cognitively make the
distinction based on a limiting instruction.127
119

United States v. Winn, 948 F.2d 145, 159 (5th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 158.
121
See Lockhart, supra note 118, § 2(b).
122
Id.
123
United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 738 (4th Cir. 1991).
124
United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 205 (3d Cir. 1992).
125
See Lockhart, supra note 118, § 2(b).
126
Id. (“It is necessary to give appropriate limiting instructions informing the jury that
the summary [under 611(a)] itself is not evidence, and that it must disregard the summary to
whatever extent it determines the summary to be inconsistent with, or not supported by, the
actual evidence.”). See, e.g., Daniel v. Ben E. Keith Co., 97 F.3d 1329, 1335 (10th Cir.
1996) (citing Gomez v. Great Lakes Steel Div., Nat’l Steel Corp., 803 F.2d 250, 258 (6th
Cir. 1986)).
127
See, e.g., Robert R. Calo, Joint Trials, Spillover Prejudice, and the Ineffectiveness of
a Bare Limiting Instruction, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 21, 25 (1985) (stating that “there are
some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so
great and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human
120
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III. ANALYSIS
A. FRE 1006 AND THE HEARSAY RULE

Inquiries under Crawford and its progeny have centered on
confrontation issues related to otherwise admissible hearsay evidence.128
For this reason, summary exhibits under FRE 1006 have yet to be
scrutinized under the Confrontation Clause. Perhaps this should not come
as a surprise since the purpose of Crawford was to sever the substantive
guarantees of reliability embodied in the hearsay exceptions from the
procedural guarantee to test that reliability secured by the Sixth
Amendment. However, as Confrontation Clause jurisprudence develops,
the Court will inevitably have to address whether summaries—specifically
those that are testimonial—are themselves statements that implicate the
confrontation right.
FRE 1006’s location within the Federal Rules of Evidence deceptively
suggests it is no more than one of a handful of exceptions to the “Best
Evidence Rule,” FRE 1002.129 The Best Evidence Rule codifies the
limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored”). But see Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S.
307, 324 n.9 (1985) (“Absent . . . extraordinary situations . . . we adhere to the crucial
assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury that jurors carefully follow
instructions.”); Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979) (dictum) (“A crucial assumption
underlying [the jury system] is that juries will follow the instructions given to them by the
trial judge.”).
Concerns about the limitations of jury instructions often relate to the admission of
prior acts evidence used for the limited purpose of attacking a defendant’s credibility as
opposed to proving propensity. See Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the
Federal Courts Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior
Convictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 300 (2008). While the consequences of the jury
drawing an improper inference in those cases are arguably greater than the jury drawing an
improper inference from a demonstrative aid, the subtle nature of the difference between
demonstrative aids and FRE 1006 summaries may make it more difficult for a jury to
distinguish between the proper and improper use.
128
See, e.g., Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2682 (2008) (addressing the application
of the Confrontation Clause to statements admitted under a “provision of California law that
permits admission of out-of-court statements describing the infliction or threat of physical
injury on a declarant when the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial and the prior
statements are deemed trustworthy); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006)
(finding the admission of statements under the present sense impression exception a
violation of the defendant’s confrontation right where the defendant did not have an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness who made the statements).
129
Rules 1001 through 1008 are codified in Article X of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
titled “Contents of Writings, Recordings, and Photographs.” FRE 1002 is titled
“Requirements of the Original” and states that “[a]n original writing, recording, or
photograph is required in order to prove its contents unless these rules or a federal statute
provide otherwise.” FED. R. EVID. 1002. With the exception of FRE 1008, which concerns
the “Functions of the Court and Jury,” the remaining rules provide for exceptions to FRE
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principle that “[w]hen a writing, recording, or photograph is offered to
prove its content, the chances are good that the original will be more
trustworthy than a copy.”130
Despite this codification, the rule acts in many ways as a hearsay
exception. Both FRE 1006 summaries and the underlying documents are
prepared out of court. They are also intended to be received as substantive
evidence asserting the truth of the matters contained within them.131 If it
were not for FRE 1006, these summaries would be hearsay under FRE
801(c) and FRE 802,132 and their admissibility would depend on whether
there was an applicable exception. The reason summary exhibits do not
demand a separate hearsay exception is because FRE 1006 already requires
that all underlying data be proven admissible. Therefore, while the
summary may be received as substantive evidence, it does not enable the
“backdoor” admission of any new and otherwise inadmissible evidence.133
Rather, summaries simply allow for the convenient presentation of
information that has already been deemed admissible. The hearsay
exceptions set forth in FRE 803 and FRE 804,134 on the other hand, allow
for the admission of evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible but for
the exception. For example, but for the public records exception under FRE
803(8),135 triers of fact would not be able to view records and data
1002’s requirement of originals. This placement makes it easy to overlook the significance
of FRE 1006 in other contexts.
130
RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 198 (4th ed. 2006).
131
Again, this is in contrast to pedagogical summaries admitted as demonstrative aids
under FRE 611(a).
132
FED. R. EVID. 801(c), 802. Rule 801(c) defines hearsay as “a statement that (1) the
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Rule 802 states that
“[h]earsay evidence is not admissible” unless a federal statute, the Federal Rules of
Evidence, or the Supreme Court indicate otherwise.
133
In evidence law, the term “backdoor” refers to the tactic of admitting a particular
piece of evidence under the pretense that it is being offered for an admissible purpose when
it is in fact being offered for a purpose prohibited by the rules of evidence. See, e.g., Martin
A. Schwartz, Trial Evidence 2012: Advocacy Analysis, Illustrations, 881 PLI/LIT 19, 271
(2012) (“The proponent of a Rule 1006 chart must lay a foundation showing . . . the
underlying voluminous documents are admissible, e.g., under the business records rule; in
other words, Rule 1006 is not a backdoor way of getting inadmissible evidence before the
jury.”).
134
FED. R. EVID. 803, 804. FRE 803 lists “exceptions to the rule against hearsay—
regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness.” FRE 804 provides for
exceptions “when the declarant is unavailable as a witness.”
135
FED. R. EVID. 803(8). The rule allows for the admission of:
A record or statement of a public office if: (A) it sets out: (i) the office’s activities; (ii) a matter
observed while under a legal duty to report, but not including, in a criminal case, a matter
observed by law-enforcement personnel; or (iii) in a civil case or against the government in a
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compilations of public agencies. The case is different for summaries. Even
if the government chooses not to use the summary, every piece of
information reflected in the summary may still make it to the trier of fact if
it is otherwise admissible.136
A question the Court has yet to address is whether this difference
protects defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. After
Crawford and Melendez-Diaz, prosecutors may no longer rely on “firmlyrooted hearsay exception[s]” or “particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness” to offer testimonial evidence against a criminal defendant
without affording him the opportunity for cross-examination.137 If a
summary exhibit is the product of testimonial statements, it may be time to
consider whether it should be admitted under FRE 1006 without
confrontation.
Crawford’s focus on separating hearsay from the
Confrontation Clause does not preclude the possibility that other types of
evidence, such as testimonial summary exhibits, could implicate
confrontation concerns when the defendant is afforded no opportunity to
cross-examine the preparer of the summary.
B. WHEN A SUMMARY IS MORE THAN JUST A SUMMARY

When received as substantive evidence, a summary is more than just a
mere recapitulation of voluminous information. Depending on how the
summary is presented, it is also a statement in and of itself. A summary
exhibit reflects not only a set of underlying data, but also the subjective
determinations of the preparer, her procedures for distilling the voluminous
information, and her decision of how the data should be presented.
Moreover, because juries rarely see the voluminous underlying data itself
(which need not be entered into evidence), the summary is often the only
evidence the trier of fact will see on the point at issue.138
The procedures of a forensic accounting team conducting a fraud
investigation illustrate how a summary exhibit might raise Confrontation
Clause concerns. Certified fraud examiners, accountants, and auditors are
often called upon to testify in criminal prosecutions where their testimony
can be used to support charges such as fraud, embezzlement, misapplication

criminal case, factual findings from a legally authorized investigation; and (B) neither the source
of the information nor other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
136

Peat, Inc. v. Vanguard Research, Inc., 378 F.3d 1154, 1160 (11th Cir. 2004).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42, 68–69 (2003).
138
See Lockhart, supra note 118, § 3 (listing several cases where courts held either that it
was not necessary to have the underlying materials admitted into evidence or that it was not
error to admit summaries without admitting underlying materials).
137
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of funds, or improper accounting practices.139 Lawyers often rely on these
financial experts to “help crystallize the judge and/or jury’s
comprehension” of complex cases.140 Fraud examiners analyze large
amounts of data, conduct interviews, and ultimately produce reports
detailing the findings of their investigations.141 Forensic accountants pore
through thousands of documents and electronic files during the course of an
investigation.142 Often, each individual document requires the forensic
accountant to make a determination of whether the document is relevant or
irrelevant, and whether it should be flagged for any particular reason.143
The accountant might record his or her findings using either a database or a
“key document” file, which keeps track of the documents determined by the
investigator to be the most relevant.144
The criteria used to determine whether a document should be flagged
vary with each investigation. In some instances, the forensic accountant’s
determinations are objective and similar to those of an auditor. Examples
include marking whether an invoice is signed, whether the dollar amounts
total correctly, or whether a transaction was approved before a particular
date. In other instances, however, a fraud examiner may be searching for
attributes that require more judgment, such as whether a document appears
forged, fabricated, or manipulated, or whether signatures appear to
match.145 Although not expected to be documents experts, fraud examiners
are also required to make subjective determinations that involve comparing
papers and inks, determining whether two sheets of paper came from the
same tablet or pad of paper, comparing torn or cut paper edges, identifying
whether two photocopies came from the same copy machine, determining
the resealing of sealed documents, and examining adhesives, among other
things.146
To the extent that subjective determinations are required to distill large
amounts of information into a summary exhibit, the summary exhibit is
more than just a mere reduction of voluminous data. It becomes an exhibit
139

ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, FRAUD EXAMINERS MANUAL § 2.701 (2010)
[hereinafter FRAUD EXAMINERS MANUAL].
140
Id. § 2.701.
141
Id. § 2.704 (discussing the preparation of the expert report); id. § 3.101 (discussing
document examination); id. § 3.201 (discussing interviews related to a fraud investigation).
142
Id. § 3.101.
143
Id.
144
Id. § 3.103. Fraud examiners will often utilize spreadsheet software to organize their
efforts. While the organizational method will vary with each investigation, a classic
example of a tracking file would be a spreadsheet where each row lists a “relevant”
document and each column reflects a specific attribute of that document.
145
Id. §§ 3.104–.105.
146
Id. §§ 3.105–.106.
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that embodies dozens, if not hundreds, of subjective appraisals of
documents offered as evidence against the accused.
Moreover, the relevance of documents cannot be easily ascertained
early in an investigation.147 For this reason, the Fraud Examiners Manual
recommends that “all possible relevant documents be obtained.”148 The
decision of which specific criteria should be tested in the first place is
subjective and made early in the investigation by the forensic accounting
team, often with the help of documents experts.149 The substance and
presentation of the summary exhibit produced and used at trial would
undoubtedly be affected by the accountant’s initial determinations regarding
what is and is not relevant.
By not allowing a defendant to cross-examine the individuals who
determined which criteria would be tested and how it would be tested, the
defendant is deprived of a crucial opportunity to probe and dissect the
weaknesses of summary exhibits offered against him under FRE 1006. In
fact, the Fraud Examiners Manual acknowledges that “documents can
either help or hurt a case, depending on which ones are presented and how
they are presented.”150
The subjectivity involved in creating a summary exhibit does not end
there. While documents are being analyzed, or immediately thereafter,
fraud examiners use software to employ a variety of techniques in order to
illuminate suspicious patterns and anomalies.151 These techniques include
sorting, filtering, duplicate searches, and vertical and horizontal ratio
analysis, among others.152 Again, the specific manner by which this process
takes place could be based on a combination of individual experience,
standard protocol, or specific information gleaned in that particular
investigation. Then, once the data has been sorted and the accountant has
extracted information he deems pertinent to the investigation, a more senior
forensic accountant might collaborate with the rest of the team to prepare a
report of the findings of the investigation. This report will also describe the
nature of the engagement and the procedures employed during the course of
the investigation.153
147

Id. §§ 3.101, 3.103.
Id. § 3.101.
149
Id. § 3.105.
150
Id. (emphasis added).
151
Id. § 3.601.
152
Id.
153
The Fraud Examiners Manual neither mandates nor suggests a specific manner of
dividing responsibility among the members of a forensic accounting team. There is no rule
requiring senior-level accountants to contribute to the preparation of the report, nor is there a
rule prohibiting staff accountants from preparing reports. The specific division of labor will
148
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If the forensic accountant’s findings are used in a trial, the jury may be
presented with only a summary exhibit that provides a snapshot of the
findings. The summary exhibit could come in various forms, including
graphs, charts, tables with figures, or any other format the proponent of the
summary exhibit deems effective in illustrating investigation findings to the
jury and that the court does not find unfairly prejudicial.154
This process of synthesizing raw documents and data into a summary
exhibit involves subjective decisionmaking at almost every step. 155 When
reviewing documents, the decision of which attributes should be tested is a
subjective one, or at the very least involves subjective elements. The
determinations of whether a particular signature is fraudulent, whether an
expense is reasonable, or whether the ink on two separate documents is
identical requires a judgment call. In the analysis phase, the determination
of how the prevalence of each “flag” should be analyzed across the entire
population of documents is also subjective. Finally, the accountant’s
decision of how to present the data most effectively in the form of a
summary exhibit is subjective.156
The multiple layers of discretionary decisionmaking that separate the
underlying information from the summary exhibit are what make a
summary exhibit more than just a “summary.” Rather, a summary exhibit
created through processes analogous to the one described above should be
viewed as a collection of separate, independent statements. Every time the
forensic accountant makes a subjective determination as to the meaning or
implication of a particular document, the accountant is in essence making
an out-of-court statement against the defendant, which then appears or is
reflected in a summary exhibit. When offered against a defendant as
substantive evidence under FRE 1006 in a criminal prosecution, the
Confrontation Clause demands that the defendant have the opportunity to
cross-examine the maker of that statement.
Courts have expressed concern about the admission of summary
exhibits, suggesting that summaries are more than just restatements that
highlight certain information.157 One concern is that summary exhibits give
likely be driven by practical considerations, such the team’s level of experience, areas of
competency, and staffing constraints.
154
See Lockhart, supra note 118, § 4(a) (listing cases where courts have admitted
summary exhibits taking a variety of forms, including graphs, charts, and tables); FRAUD
EXAMINERS MANUAL, supra note 139, §§ 27, 29–30 (discussing cases where courts have
refused to admit summary exhibits on the basis that they would be unfairly prejudicial under
FRE 403).
155
FRAUD EXAMINERS MANUAL, supra note 139, §§ 3.104–.106.
156
Id. § 3.101.
157
See, e.g., United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that
there are “obvious dangers” posed by summary exhibits, including the possibility that the
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the prosecution the opportunity to make two closing arguments.158 The fear
is that jurors will perceive the proponent’s arguments as more convincing
because they will have one side of the case summarized for them twice—
once from the witness who presents the summary and again during closing
arguments and rebuttal.159 Another danger is that jurors will simply be
unduly grateful to one party for presenting them with a coherent and
succinct summary of the evidence in a complex case.160 Admittedly, these
issues are addressed by a different rule, FRE 403, which allows judges to
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury.161 Nevertheless, these concerns suggest that courts consider summary
exhibits separate statements, not just recapitulative learning tools for the
jury.
While not discussed in the context of the Confrontation Clause,
Mueller and Kirkpatrick’s treatise on federal evidence law addresses the
concern that summaries “may include conclusions or interpretations
suggested by competent witnesses that in effect sum up the entries in the
summary itself.”162 The treatise acknowledges that “[t]o some extent . . .
summary evidence necessarily involves selecting some things and leaving
out others, and necessarily it involves interpreting and drawing conclusions,
for these processes are inherent in the task of condensing a mass of material
into a form that is shorter and more readily understandable.”163 Because
jury will “treat the summary as additional evidence or as corroborative of the truth of the
underlying testimony”); United States v. Means, 695 F.2d 811, 817 (5th Cir. 1983)
(recognizing “the powerful impression which charts can make upon a jury, vesting the charts
with ‘an air of credibility’ independent of the evidence purported to be summarized” (citing
Steele v. United States, 222 F.2d 628, 630 (5th Cir. 1955))).
158
Pamela H. Bucy, The Poor Fit of Traditional Evidentiary Doctrine and Sophisticated
Crime: An Empirical Analysis of Health Care Fraud Prosecutions, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
383, 420 (1995) (“[A]uthentication of summaries may allow their proponent the equivalent
of an additional closing argument through the summary.”); Lauren Weiser, Note,
Requirements for Admitting Summary Testimony of Government Agents in Federal White
Collar Cases, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 179, 181 (2008); see also United States v. Fullwood, 342
F.3d 409, 414 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[S]ummary witnesses are not to be used as a substitute for,
or a supplement to, closing argument.”).
159
Means, 695 F.2d at 817 (“[W]e recognize the powerful impression which charts can
make upon a jury, vesting the charts with ‘an air of credibility’ independent of the evidence
purported to be summarized.” (quoting Steele, 222 F.2d at 630)).
160
Bucy, supra note 158, at 420–21.
161
FED. R. EVID. 403.
162
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 5 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 10:34, at
836 (3d ed. 2007).
163
Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 816 (11th Cir. 1984) (admitting a
forty-page chart consisting of fifteen columns in a Medicare fraud trial where the charts were
“derived either from other exhibits received into evidence or from oral testimony,” and the
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conclusions drawn from the underlying voluminous information “are one
step further removed from otherwise admissible evidence, and while
summary proof necessarily entails hearsay risks (summaries restate, even as
they condense, although this hearsay point is usually overlooked),
interpretive conclusions seem to increase the hearsay risks (the conclusions
are a restater’s restatement of his own restatement).”164 This overlooking of
the hearsay issue when admitting a summary exhibit that not only
condenses but also restates the underlying evidence in the form of an
interpretive conclusion is flatly inconsistent with Crawford. Under
Crawford, a defendant should have the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses against him, regardless of whether the statements fall within an
evidentiary rule that otherwise allows for their admission.165
C. SUMMARIES ARE TESTIMONIAL

For a summary to implicate the Confrontation Clause, it must also be
testimonial.166 That is, it must be a summary that satisfies the primary
purpose test articulated in Davis and reaffirmed in Bullcoming.167 The
definition and scope of what is testimonial currently rests on Justice
Clarence Thomas’s construction of the term.168
Justice Thomas’s
concurring opinion in Melendez-Diaz construes the term more narrowly
than the rest of the Melendez-Diaz majority. According to Justice Thomas,
“the Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only
insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.”169 With Justice
Thomas carrying the deciding vote in Melendez-Diaz, this narrower
definition of testimonial controls. The difference between Justice Thomas’s

last two columns reflected conclusions by a Health and Human Services Special Agent, who
was qualified as an expert).
164
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 10:34, at 836 (emphasis added).
165
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
166
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006).
167
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2714, n.6 (2011); Davis, 547 U.S. at
822.
168
It should be noted that to the extent that there have been changes on the Supreme
Court since Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009), was decided, those
changes do not weigh in favor of broadening the scope of the opinion. The four dissenting
Justices with the narrowest construction of the Confrontation Clause (Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito) remain on the Court. Justice Thomas, who sided
with the majority but wrote a concurring opinion limiting its scope, also remains on the
Court.
169
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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construction and the rest of the majority’s is the addition of the word
“formalized.”170
While the examples Justice Thomas lists—affidavits, depositions,
prior testimony, and confessions—suggest that most formalized testimonial
materials must be sworn or provided under oath, Bullcoming makes it clear
that this is not the case. Under Bullcoming, the fact that assertions are
unsworn does not remove them from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment.171
The State, attempting to distinguish Bullcoming’s case from MelendezDiaz, pointed to the fact that the lab analyst’s findings in that case were
sworn before a notary public while Caylor’s report was unsworn.172 The
Court agreed with the New Mexico Supreme Court on this point, stating
“the absence of an oath is not dispositive in determining if a statement is
testimonial.”173 Justice Sotomayor elaborated that though unsworn, “[t]he
formality [of the BAC report] derive[d] from the fact that the analyst [was]
asked to sign his name and ‘certify’ to both the result and the statements on
the form.”174
Bullcoming also reinforces the primary purpose test articulated in
Davis v. Washington.175 Whether an assertion is testimonial does not hinge
on the status of the person who makes it but rather on its “evidentiary
purpose.”176 In Bullcoming, the State maintained that the unavailable
witness’s affirmations were non-testimonial because they were neither
“adversarial” nor “inquisitorial,” but rather “simply observations of an
‘independent scientist’ made according to a non-adversarial public duty.”177
The proponent of a testimonial summary exhibit could make a similar
argument—that the individuals who made the assertions reflected in the
summary are, in the forensic accounting context for example, “independent
investigators” and not accusatory witnesses against the defendant.
Bullcoming suggests that such an argument would be unavailing.
Reaffirming its adherence to the primary purpose test, the Court held that
“[a] document created solely for an evidentiary purpose . . . , made in aid of
170

Fenner, supra note 13, at 39.
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717.
172
Id.
173
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Though this may appear to be an expansion of
the holding in Melendez-Diaz, the Court did not see this as breaking new ground, stating that
“[i]ndeed, in Crawford, this Court rejected as untenable any construction of the
Confrontation Clause that would render inadmissible only sworn ex parte affidavits, while
leaving admission of formal, but unsworn statements perfectly okay.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
174
Id. at 2721 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
175
Id. at 2714, n.6 (majority opinion).
176
Id. at 2717.
177
Id.
171
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a police investigation, ranks as testimonial.”178 It would be difficult for the
proponent of a testimonial summary to find a meaningful distinction
between an investigation led by the police with the aid of a crime lab and a
criminal investigation led by the SEC with the aid of a forensic accounting
team. In neither case, under Bullcoming, would the proponent of a
summary be able to rely on the witness’s independent status to avoid the
Sixth Amendment mandate.
Justice Sotomayor wrote a separate concurrence to detail how the
primary purpose test applied to Bullcoming’s case.179 Some of the language
from this concurrence might help illuminate how the test could apply to
summary exhibits.
According to Justice Sotomayor, a statement is testimonial if “it has ‘a
primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial
testimony.’”180 Absent confrontation, such statements are inadmissible,
notwithstanding the fact that they may fall within a hearsay exception.181
Therefore courts should look to whether a summary exhibit was derived
from assertions intended to be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution
when determining whether the Confrontation Clause applies. In the
forensic accounting context, if the primary purpose of an investigation is
not to produce evidence for criminal prosecution, confrontation would not
be required. Justice Sotomayor specifically noted that Bullcoming did not
present a case where “the State suggested an alternate purpose, much less
an alternate primary purpose, for the BAC report.”182 This notation
suggests that assertions made during an internal fraud investigation would
not be testimonial, even if those same assertions were eventually used by
the government to create a summary exhibit in a criminal prosecution.183
Otherwise, if a summary exhibit is being offered, if it was prepared in
anticipation of litigation, and if the statements contain the results of
subjective determinations of what is important and how it should be
178

Id. at 2717.
Id. at 2719 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
180
Id. at 2720 (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011)).
181
Id. (stating that because the purpose of the certificates in Melendez-Diaz was use at
trial, they were not properly admissible as business or public records under the hearsay
rules).
182
Id. at 2721.
183
In this hypothetical, the summary exhibit itself should still be testimonial under the
primary purpose test. While the assertions reflected in the summary may not have been
made with an eye toward litigation, the same could not be said about the summary exhibit
derived from them. However if the summary exhibit is testimonial evidence but the
underlying assertions are not, the only individual who would need to be confronted would be
the preparer of the summary. As mentioned earlier, the testifying expert and preparer of the
summary are often the same person.
179
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presented, then the Confrontation Clause demands that the defendant be
given the opportunity to cross-examine the preparer of the summary.
D. “THE ONLY INDICIUM OF RELIABILITY . . . THE CONSTITUTION
ACTUALLY PRESCRIBES . . . .”184

In a pre-Crawford era, one could justify “overlooking” the hearsay
problem inherent in summaries that are a step (or in the case of our forensic
accountant, several steps) removed from the underlying voluminous
information. The information contained within the summary, whether
objective or conclusory, must be based on information that is admissible.
Under Roberts, this meant the information underlying the summary would
have to fall within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception or bear particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.”185 So long as this was the case, admitting a
testimonial summary exhibit did not offend FRE 1006 or pre-Crawford
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.186
Furthermore, FRE 1006 requires that the underlying voluminous
information be provided to opposing counsel within a reasonable time
period.187 This requirement gives defendants an opportunity to dissect the
raw information, identify instances of poor judgment or partisan zeal, crossexamine the expert, and perhaps even prepare a separate summary exhibit to
counter the prosecution’s summary. However, the question remains: Will
defendants have been adequately afforded the right to confront their
accusers if given access to the underlying data, or does the Confrontation
Clause mandate an opportunity to cross-examine those who made the
statements reflected in the summary?
While the protections built into FRE 1006 undoubtedly place
defendants in a better position than they would be otherwise, they are
simply not sufficient in a post-Crawford world. If a statement is being
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, the proponent of that statement
can no longer, under Crawford, claim that the confrontation right has been
satisfied because it is reliable or admissible under the rules of evidence.188
Crawford made very clear that “the only indicium of reliability sufficient to
184

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004).
Id. at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining the rule established in Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).
186
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
187
Square Liner 360, Inc. v. Chisum, 691 F.2d 362, 376 (8th Cir. 1982); White Indus.,
Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 611 F. Supp. 1049, n.10. (W.D. Mo. 1985) (“Ordinarily that
‘reasonable time’ will be at some point before trial, since the object is to give opposing
counsel a meaningful opportunity to prepare challenges to the materials; although it would
be within the trial court’s discretion to permit the matter to be dealt with during trial.”).
188
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (“Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation.”).
185
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satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually
prescribes: confrontation.”189 Summaries already carry the inherent risk
that “important details may be overlooked because they are buried or
perhaps hidden by accident or partisan zeal.”190 There is also the risk that
“inadmissible evidence will creep in unnoticed, or that suggested
conclusions will be accepted uncritically because the mass of underlying
data are complex, and perhaps technical and forbidding.”191 To overlook
the hearsay problem inherent in summary exhibits, the contents of which
are layers of discretion removed from the underlying information, and
therefore are separate statements themselves, would deprive defendants of
the procedural right to highlight “partisan zeal” on the part of the
government or probe the credibility of subjective determinations reflected
in the summary through cross-examination.
The availability of underlying documents fails to satisfy the
confrontation right for one simple reason. As Justice Scalia stated in
Crawford, the only way to satisfy the constitutional right to confrontation is
confrontation.192 Other provisions of FRE 1006, such as the right to request
underlying documents,193 may help remedy the detriment to the defendant
of being unable to cross-examine the preparer of the summary, but it is not
the procedural provision the Constitution and Crawford’s progeny mandate.
Allowing for the admission of a summary exhibit without confrontation of
the individuals who analyzed the data reflected in the summaries would be
going back to the reasoning of Roberts that was explicitly rejected in
Crawford.
Rule 1006’s compensating protections notwithstanding,
Crawford and its progeny demand the opportunity for cross-examination.
Confrontation in the summary exhibit context is especially important
because not all criminal defendants have the legal resources to take full
advantage of the protections afforded in FRE 1006. A defendant with
limited resources at his disposal will likely be unable to sort through the
underlying voluminous records, analyze them in depth, retain an expert, and
produce a summary or set of summary exhibits to counter the prosecution’s
summary exhibit. Confrontation in the form of cross-examination remains
the only fair, relatively resource-neutral, and constitutionally mandated
method of appraisal.
Another danger of admitting summaries without providing the right to
confrontation is that the information underlying the summary may be based
189

Id. at 69.
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 10:34.
191
Id.
192
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69.
193
FED. R. EVID. 1006 (“The proponent must make the originals or duplicates available
for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place.”).
190
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on out-of-court statements made during the course of interviews or other
investigative activities.194 The preparer’s perspective and decisionmaking
may be affected by his preexisting biases regarding particular transactions,
people, and entities involved in the investigation. In United States v.
Lemire, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged the “obvious dangers” in
summarizing evidence and the danger of “subtle introduction of otherwise
inadmissible evidence” because witnesses relied on out-of-court statements
to understand some transactions.195 The court stated in dicta that a
“summary should not draw controversial inferences.”196 The summary in
that case was held admissible because it “involved only routine
computations and culling through of documents to eliminate confusing and
extraneous evidence.”197
The problem is that summaries often contain more than just routine
computations of mathematical data.198 Returning to our forensic accounting
investigation example, not only does the summary contain several layers of
subjective interpretation, but this interpretation is usually based at least in
part on information gleaned from interviews. Depending on how broadly
the term testimonial is to be construed, it could be argued that the
statements from these interviews, if intended to be used in criminal
proceedings and later embodied in the summary exhibit, may be open to
confrontation as well.199 According to Mueller and Kirkpatrick, “if the
author of interpretive conclusions prepared the summary entries themselves,
and if the author testifies in court and is available for cross-examination, the
added risks should not be enough to warrant exclusion.”200 But what
happens when the author or preparer of the summary does not testify in
court? What if the witness sponsoring the summary exhibit only
supervised, or worse, only reviewed the process that led to the creation of
the summary exhibit? While this may be enough to satisfy the foundation
for the exhibit for evidentiary purposes under FRE 703, it hardly seems
sufficient to satisfy the defendant’s right to confrontation for constitutional
purposes. The two may have been one and the same under Roberts, but
194

FRAUD EXAMINERS MANUAL, supra note 139, § 3.201.
720 F.2d 1327, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
196
Id. at 1350.
197
Id.
198
Lockhart, supra note 118, § 28 (discussing the dangers of argumentative or
conclusory summaries).
199
This view does not currently command the majority of the Court, but barely perhaps.
Justices Sotomayor’s and Thomas’s concurrences in Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz,
respectively, advocate for a higher bar for a statement to be considered testimonial. Justices
Ginsburg, Kagan, and Scalia have not written separately to express how broadly the term
testimonial should be construed.
200
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 10:34.
195
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they are not under Crawford. Under Crawford, confrontation is a
procedural right that can only be satisfied if the reliability of the statement
is tested “in the crucible of cross-examination.”201
Not all summary exhibits under FRE 1006 are in conflict with the
Confrontation Clause. Not all summaries are the products of the heavy
distillation process described in the above forensic accountant example. In
some cases, the summary exhibit may contain nothing more than a simple
set of arithmetic totals or averages from the underlying data.202 In another
hypothetical situation, a summary may be nothing more than a list of
transactions from multiple documents. The fewer discretionary judgment
calls required to go from the voluminous data to the summary exhibit, the
more objective the resulting summary exhibit. If a summary is truly a
simple aggregation of data or information, criminal defendants should find
it difficult to argue the summary exhibit is a separate statement.
Therefore, the adoption of this Comment’s position would not result in
Confrontation Clause violations for all testimonial summary exhibits. In
order to determine whether the admission of an FRE 1006 summary runs
afoul of the Sixth Amendment, a court should first determine whether the
summary is a purely objective aggregation of the underlying information or
whether it reflects the proponent’s subjective understanding and
conclusions about that information. If the former is true, the summary
should not be considered a statement separate from the underlying data. In
such cases, cross-examination of the sponsoring witness would sufficiently
allow the defendant to confront the testimony against him. Because the
sponsoring witness is usually the same person who supervised the analysis
of the underlying information and the preparation of the summary, a
summary that is nothing more than an objective reduction of the
voluminous information that underlies it should not raise confrontation
concerns so long as the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine a
witness who has knowledge of how the summary was created. The logic of
this position lies in the fact that there are no new “statements” or
“determinations” embodied in a purely objective summary that only
repackages admissible evidence. In deriving such a summary from the
underlying data, the only new contributions may be, for example, an
application of agreed-upon mathematical principles. Choosing to display
some transactions while leaving out others in a summary is also unlikely to
warrant exclusion.203
201

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 724 F.2d 436, 443 (5th Cir. 1984) (admitting a
summary exhibit containing simple calculations).
203
See, e.g., United States v. Bentley, 825 F.2d 1104, 1108–09 (7th Cir. 1987) (admitting
charts in a mail fraud trial showing the company’s net position in silver and copper futures
202
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In our forensic accountant example, the partner who oversaw the
investigation would usually testify as an expert witness.204 While
Melendez-Diaz did not involve a summary exhibit or forensic accountants,
the relationship between the testimonial exhibit and the underlying evidence
was similar. The evidence at issue in Melendez-Diaz was a white powder
suspected to be cocaine.205 The testimonial exhibits in question were
certificates of state laboratory analysts stating that the substance was
cocaine.206 Similar to our forensic accountant example, the Court held that
the methodology used in generating the reports “require[d] the exercise of
judgment and present[ed] a risk of error that might be explored on crossexamination.”207 The degree of subjective decisionmaking required of a
forensic accountant when analyzing a voluminous amount of underlying
information and then using that information to create a summary exhibit is
arguably much greater than the degree of judgment required of a lab analyst
when using technical devices to determine whether a particular substance is
in fact cocaine. This is why allowing for cross-examination of the preparer
of the summary is crucial.
E. EXPERT TESTIMONY AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

If several subjective determinations were necessary to create a
summary and those determinations are reflected in that summary, the right
to confrontation cannot be satisfied by simply allowing the defendant to
cross-examine the sponsoring witness. Under Crawford, the Court should
hold that the defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him is not
satisfied unless the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses who actually made those determinations. Though an expert who
supervised the preparation of a summary exhibit may be able to lay the
appropriate foundation to introduce the summary into evidence, it does not
necessarily follow that a cross-examination of that expert will allow the
defendant to probe the reliability and accuracy of that summary, or the
credibility of the assertions contained therein.
Furthermore, appellate courts rarely find reversible error for admitting
a summary exhibit under FRE 1006, even where a lower court’s admission
prompts the appellate court to give a strongly worded warning regarding
every twenty days, and rejecting the claim that the charts were improper because they did not
show other days because “charts need not be encyclopedic,” defendants could show that the
company was properly hedged at other times, and the data sample on the chart was deemed
large enough to be statistically valid).
204
FRAUD EXAMINERS MANUAL, supra note 139, § 2.701.
205
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2529 (2009).
206
Id.
207
Id. at 2537.
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unfair prejudice.208 For this reason, cross-examination may be the
defendant’s only recourse to help mitigate the damage caused by a
prejudicial summary exhibit.209 Through cross-examination, the defendant
may address the accuracy of the summaries, methods used to prepare
summaries, underlying factual assumptions, and patterns of selectivity that
may reflect bias.210 If the summary is to be considered an independent
statement (as it should be), the defendant must be given the opportunity to
cross-examine the person who actually made the assertions reflected in the
summary.
Testimonial assertions reflected in a summary exhibit may yet avoid
constitutional scrutiny. This is because under FRE 703, an expert witness
may testify to extrinsic facts and data in order to aid the trier of fact in
understanding the expert’s testimony.211 The testifying expert does not
have to be the same expert who performed the analysis. She also does not
have to be the individual who prepared the report, so long as the expert has
formed a relevant and independent conclusion based on underlying facts
and data that are reasonably relied upon by experts in that field.212 This
allows one expert to testify to the work of several individuals, and reflects a
compromise between preventing experts from becoming conduits of
inadmissible evidence and allowing the jury to hear testimony that would
facilitate a better understanding of the testimony.213 For exhibits that
summarize complex and voluminous information, this means that there is
an evidentiary basis for allowing a forensic accounting expert to testify to
the work of her subordinates. What the court would have to determine,

208

See, e.g., United States v. Fullwood, 342 F.3d 409, 413–14 (5th Cir. 2003)
(cautioning strongly against the use of summary witnesses as a “substitute for, or supplement
to, closing argument,” but still finding no reversible error despite the fact that the summary
witness was used in this fashion).
209
Weiser, supra note 158, at 203.
210
See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1412 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The defense
had full opportunity to cross-examine [the testifying government agent] about her methods
of preparing the summaries, her alleged selectivity, and her partiality.”).
211
FED. R. EVID. 703. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 allows “facts or data otherwise
inadmissible” to be presented to the jury if “their probative value in helping the jury
evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.” Id.
212
See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 537 F.3d 951, 959–60 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding
that an expert forensic scientist may testify, without violating the defendant’s right to
confrontation, about DNA evidence linking the defendant to a firearm even though the
expert did not perform any tests of her own and did not personally receive the evidence, but
instead relied solely on her peer review of the lab technician’s report).
213
Ian Volek, Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 703: The Back Door and the
Confrontation Clause, Ten Years Later, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 959 (2011) (asserting that FRE
703 may carry its own Confrontation Clause concerns because the rule could be used to
mask confrontation violations).
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however, is whether this evidentiary basis for admission should be
separated, as it was in Crawford, from the constitutional basis for admission
under the Sixth Amendment.
The Melendez-Diaz Court recognized the importance of having the
actual preparer of the testimonial evidence available for cross-examination,
especially where the preparer has exercised his judgment in creating the
exhibit.214 That case, however, did not decide whether the right to
confrontation could be satisfied by giving the defendant an opportunity to
cross-examine an expert witness who is familiar with the process through
which an exhibit was created. In many cases involving summary exhibits,
the testimony of the witness who prepares a summary exhibit is
indispensable as a practical matter.215 However, it is common for a witness
who supervised the preparation of the summary to testify in lieu of the
individual who actually prepared the exhibit.216 There is no explicit
requirement that the witness who testifies must be the witness who prepared
the exhibit.217
Bullcoming dealt with a lab report admitted under the business records
exception.218 The Court did not address the issue of whether summary
exhibits ought to be admissible without confrontation of the individuals
who made the assertions reflected in the exhibit. However, the Court’s
reasoning does provide insight into how it would approach the question.
First, Bullcoming suggests the Court would not allow summarized
testimonial assertions to escape Sixth Amendment scrutiny simply because
they are derived from a set of routine procedures. The Court recognized the
value of confrontation even where procedures are seemingly routine, noting
that cross-examination would nevertheless enable a defendant to probe the
testing process, expose lapses and lies, and highlight a witness’s potential
bias or lack of experience.219
This recognition also speaks to a second, more practical concern that
applies in the summary exhibit context: witnesses who perform routine
analyses are unlikely to be able to recount a particular test by the time they
214

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009) (“[A]n analyst’s lack
of proper training or deficiency in judgment may be disclosed on cross-examination.”).
215
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 10:34.
216
See, e.g., United States v. Bray, 139 F.3d 1104, 1110 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that in
order to lay a proper foundation for a summary to be admitted into evidence under FRE
1006, the proponent should present the testimony of the witness who supervised its
preparation).
217
See, e.g., United States v. Bertoli, 854 F. Supp. 975, 1055 (D.N.J. 1994) (admitting
summary exhibits authenticated by a person able to attest that they accurately summarized
the underlying material rather than by someone who actually prepared the exhibits).
218
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2011).
219
Id. at 2715.

2012]

SUMMARY EXHIBITS

883

are called to testify, diminishing any benefit that could be derived from
cross-examination. Similarly, a forensic accountant who has pored through
thousands of documents months or even years before trial may not
remember specific details at a trial or deposition. The Bullcoming Court
recognized these challenges but stated that the defendant’s attorney could
still have “raise[d] before a jury questions concerning [the analyst’s]
proficiency, the care he took in performing his work, and his veracity.”220
More fundamentally, the Court held that “the [Confrontation] Clause does
not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because the court believes
that questioning one witness about another’s testimonial statements
provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination.”221
Apparently recognizing the potential impact Bullcoming may have on
the admissibility of expert testimony, Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to
“emphasize the limited reach of the Court’s opinion” in this regard.222 First,
she noted that Bullcoming was “not a case in which the person testifying is
a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited,
connection to the scientific test at issue.”223 Justice Sotomayor found
significant the fact that “Razatos conceded . . . that he played no role in
producing the BAC report and did not observe any portion of Curtis
Caylor’s conduct of the testing.”224 She went on to state that “[i]t would be
a different case if, for example, a supervisor who observed an analyst
conducting a test testified about the result or a report about such results.”225
The concurrence gives a hint, but no details on exactly how the Court
should analyze such a case. Justice Sotomayor closes the discussion by
stating “[w]e need not address what degree of involvement [by the expert]
is sufficient because here Razatos had no involvement whatsoever in the
relevant test and report.”226 Because Justice Sotomayor provided the fifth
and final vote in the Bullcoming majority, the constitutionality of admitting
a testimonial summary exhibit through an expert witness may turn on the
expert’s “degree of involvement” with the analysis underlying the
summary. It remains to be seen what degree of involvement would be
necessary for the expert’s testimony to avoid constitutional scrutiny.
The forensic accounting hypothetical described above illustrates the
importance of allowing criminal defendants to confront the individuals who
actually make the assertions against them. In a forensic accounting
220
221
222
223
224
225
226

Id. at 2715 n.7.
Id. at 2716.
Id. at 2719 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2722.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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investigation, the partner managing the engagement would be most likely to
testify in court should the case go to trial.227 While this partner may have
planned the overall engagement strategy and is likely to know more about
the investigation at a macro level than anyone else, it is usually the
partner’s subordinates (staff accountants, senior staff accountants,
managers, etc.) who make most of the document-specific judgment calls
that eventually lead to the creation of a summary exhibit. The following
hypothetical illustrates how the various tasks associated with a fraud
investigation may be divided among the members of a forensic accounting
team: The staff-level accountant may be the one to determine whether a
signature appears fraudulent, or whether the expense was “reasonable” or
“necessary.” A senior staff accountant or manager may conduct interviews
with employees and later determine how the staff accountants’ results
should be sorted, filtered, and presented. The manager may then prepare a
draft copy of a report summarizing the investigation. The supervising
partner then reviews the draft report and any potential summary charts or
tables and communicates with the staff accountants and managers in order
to gain an understanding of how they were put together.
This
understanding would serve as the basis for the partner’s testimony if she
were to be called to testify in court as an expert witness.228
This process raises the question of whether the right to confrontation
requires giving the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the person
who actually made the decisions that led to the information contained
within the summary, or whether it is sufficient that the defendant was
allowed to cross-examine the partner who supervised the overall
investigation. The members of the forensic accounting team involved in the
creation of a summary exhibit are clearly accusatory witnesses against the
defendant under Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. To the extent that their
subjective determinations throughout the investigation are reflected in a
summary exhibit, they certainly “provide[] testimony against [the
defendant], proving [facts] necessary for . . . conviction.”229 Melendez-Diaz
made clear that “there is not a . . . category of witnesses, helpful to the
prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation.”230 It is also
important to point out that this is not a chain-of-custody issue. Melendez227

See FRAUD EXAMINERS MANUAL, supra note 139, §§ 2.701, 2.707.
It is worth reiterating that this hypothetical division of responsibility is neither
mandated or suggested in the Fraud Examiners Manual. The hypothetical is intended to
serve as an example of how multiple individuals play an integral role in developing the
testimonial assertions reflected in a summary exhibit. The exact division of labor may vary
with each investigation.
229
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2533 (2009).
230
Id. at 2534.
228

2012]

SUMMARY EXHIBITS

885

Diaz made clear that it is not necessary for every individual who handled a
piece of evidence to come to court to testify against a defendant.231 In the
case of a summary exhibit, the danger is that different individuals made
separate, often subjective determinations related to the investigation, and
that these determinations are reflected in the summary exhibit admitted at
trial without the defendant having the opportunity to cross-examine those
individuals.
Cases before Crawford and Melendez-Diaz suggested that it would be
sufficient to have only the partner who managed the investigation testify to
the summary exhibit. In United States v. Behrens, the court admitted a
summary exhibit over objections that the chart lacked foundation, holding
that foundation can be laid through the testimony of a witness who
supervised the preparation of the exhibit.232 Behrens, however, was decided
long before Crawford (and, in fact, in the shadow of Roberts), and admitted
the summary on the basis that there was a sufficient foundation for
evidentiary purposes.233 Behrens did not decide whether there was any
constitutional impediment to the admission of a summary exhibit when the
defendant was not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine its preparer.234
The holding in Behrens, therefore, while allowing for the admission of a
summary through a witness other than the preparer of the summary, does
not foreclose the exclusion of a similar summary today on Sixth
Amendment grounds.
Similarly, United States v. Moon, which was decided after Crawford
but before Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, concerned a doctor who was
charged with fraud arising from billing Medicaid and other insurance
programs for full doses of chemotherapy while administering only partial
doses.235 The prosecution introduced summary charts, which compared the
drugs the defendant purchased with the amount she claimed to administer,
and then estimated her resultant profits from the demonstrated
discrepancy.236 The Sixth Circuit held that such charts were accurate, not
unfairly prejudicial, and admissible if introduced by an agent who
supervised preparation.237
Moon, like Behrens, held that there was adequate foundation for
admission without addressing any constitutional issues related to
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Id. at 2532 n.1.
689 F.2d 154, 161 (10th Cir. 1982).
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United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 532 (6th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 545.
Id. at 546.
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confrontation.238 There are two reasons why Moon should not foreclose the
existence of constitutional problems inherent in the use of this evidence,
notwithstanding the fact that it was decided after Crawford. First, no Sixth
Amendment challenge was made in Moon.239 Second, Moon was decided
before Melendez-Diaz, where the Court held that the “witnesses against
him” phrase in the Sixth Amendment means all witnesses who provide
testimony against the petitioner.240 When Moon was decided, “witnesses
against” the accused was understood to mean traditional witnesses of the
type Justice Kennedy discussed in the Melendez-Diaz dissent.241
IV. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF WILLIAMS V. ILLINOIS
In Williams v. Illinois,242 the Supreme Court addressed whether the
Sixth Amendment bars the admission against a criminal defendant of
assertions made by an out-of-court declarant that are offered through the
testimony of an expert witness. Because summary exhibits under FRE
1006 are commonly offered through the testimony of an expert witness,243
the Court’s decision in Williams will undoubtedly affect how summary
exhibits derived from testimonial assertions will be treated under the Sixth
Amendment.
However, because the Williams plurality reached its
conclusion through a questionable and previously discredited analysis, it is
unclear exactly how the decision will influence constitutional scrutiny of
summary exhibits.
In Williams, the defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated
criminal sexual assault, one count of aggravated kidnapping, and one count
of aggravated robbery.244 The victim, L.J., was taken to the emergency
room where a physician treated her and took vaginal swabs.245 The vaginal
swabs were sealed, placed in a criminal sexual assault kit, and sent to the
Illinois State Police (ISP) crime lab for testing and analysis.246 A forensic
biologist at the lab, Brian Hapack, received the kit and performed an acid
phosphatase test that confirmed the presence of semen.247 Hapack testified
238

Id. at 545–46; Behrens, 689 F.2d at 161.
513 F.3d 527.
240
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2533–34 (2009).
241
Id. at 2551–52 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). According to Justice Kennedy, traditional
witnesses are those witnesses who (1) recall events they actually observed in the past instead
of making near-contemporaneous observations, (2) observe a crime or “any human action
related to it,” or (3) provide statements in response to interrogation. Id.
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132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
243
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 10:34.
244
People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268, 269 (Ill. 2010).
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Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2229.
246
Id.
247
Id.
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that after performing the test, he resealed the evidence and left it in a secure
freezer at the ISP lab.248 Hapack “guaranteed the accuracy of his results by
working in a clean environment free from contamination and by ensuring
the tests functioned properly.”249 The ISP lab sent those samples to
Cellmark Diagnostic Laboratory in Maryland for DNA analysis.250
Cellmark derived a DNA profile of the person whose semen was recovered
from the victim and sent the profile back to the ISP lab.251 At this point in
time, Williams, the eventual defendant, was not under suspicion for L.J.’s
rape.252
An ISP forensic specialist, Sandra Lambatos, ran a computer search
comparing the Cellmark profile against entries in the state DNA dabatase.253
It matched a profile produced from a blood sample taken from the
defendant after he was arrested for an unrelated offense.254 At a police
lineup a little over a year later, L.J. identified the defendant as her
assailant.255 The defendant was indicted for aggravated criminal sexual
assault, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery.256
At trial, the court accepted Lambatos as an expert witness in forensic
biology and forensic DNA analysis.257 Lambatos described the process of
analyzing and comparing DNA. She testified that having one DNA expert
rely on another DNA expert’s records in order to complete her work is a
“commonly accepted” practice within the relevant scientific community.258
She further testified that Cellmark was an “accredited crime lab,” and that
the ISP lab routinely sent evidence to Cellmark.259
When the prosecutor attempted to ask Lambatos for her expert opinion
regarding the DNA profiles, Williams’s counsel objected, asserting that
Lambatos could not rely on testing performed by another lab.260 The trial
court judge allowed Lambatos to testify that the DNA profile received from
Cellmark matched the defendant’s DNA profile from the blood sample in
the ISP database.261 While the Cellmark report was never introduced into
248
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evidence, Lambatos was allowed to testify to her conclusions, which were
informed by the report.262 Lombatos confirmed during cross-examination
that her testimony depended on the profile produced by Cellmark and that
she personally did not perform or observe the testing of the vaginal
swabs.263 Cellmark’s status as an accredited lab gave Lombatos confidence
that its work was reliable, even though she did not see any of the work that
Cellmark put in to produce the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs.264
When Lambatos finished testifying, the defense moved to exclude her
testimony on Confrontation Clause grounds insofar as that testimony
implicated events at the Cellmark lab.265 The prosecution, relying on
Illinois Rule of Evidence 703, argued that even if an expert is not
competent to testify to the facts on which his opinion is based, he is
permitted to disclose those underlying facts.266 The trial judge agreed with
the prosecution and admitted the evidence.267 Williams was found guilty on
all counts.268
On appeal, the defendant argued that allowing Lambatos to testify to
the testing completed by Cellmark violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confront the witnesses against him.269 The Illinois Appellate Court
disagreed, stating that the Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of
testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the
matter asserted.”270 The Cellmark report, according to the court, was only
offered to provide a basis for Lambatos’s opinion.271 The conviction was
affirmed and the defendant appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.272 The
Illinois Supreme Court upheld Williams’s conviction, also finding no Sixth
Amendment violation because the Cellmark report was not being offered
for the truth of its contents, but for the purpose of explaining the basis for
Lambatos’s opinion.273 According to the Court, the only statement that the
prosecution offered for the truth of the matter asserted was Lambatos’s own
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Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2230.
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People v. Williams, 895 N.E.2d 961, 969 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (quoting Crawford v.
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opinion, making unnecessary the presentation of the person who prepared
the DNA profile at Cellmark.274
A plurality of the United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding the
defendant’s right to confrontation was not violated because (1) the
Cellmark findings used against him were offered only to explain the basis
for Lambatos’s expert opinion and not to prove the truth of the matters
asserted therein, and (2) the Cellmark report, even if admitted into evidence
(which it was not) was “very different from the sort of extrajudicial
statements, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, and confessions,
that the Confrontation Clause was originally understood to reach.”275 For
the reasons discussed below, Williams leaves our Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence more confused than ever before. It also offers few answers to
the question of how the Court would treat a summary exhibit offered
against a criminal defendant to prove the truth of the contents reflected
within it.
A. A FLAWED AND FRACTURED DECISION

Williams is problematic for several reasons. First, the decision takes
the Court’s otherwise consistently (albeit rapidly) developing Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence and turns it on its head with a mishmash of partially
overlapping opinions that leave everyone guessing how to determine when
the confrontation right applies and when it does not. The plurality,
comprised of precisely the same Justices who so vehemently dissented in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, purports to uphold those decisions yet
offends their reasoning at every step of its analysis. Even worse, five
Justices—including Justice Thomas, who concurred only in the judgment—
completely disagree with the plurality’s reasoning and analysis.276
The Court’s conclusion that the Cellmark lab’s findings were not
offered for their truth ignores the reality of so-called “basis evidence.” If an
expert testifies to a conclusion, and states that the conclusion is based on
the assumption that a particular set of underlying facts is true, then the jury
must accept those underlying assertions for their truth in order to agree with
the expert’s conclusion.277 In Williams, since the validity of Lambatos’s
274

People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268, 278 (Ill. 2010).
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228.
276
Id. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“I call Justice Alito’s opinion ‘the plurality,’
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conclusion ultimately turned on the truth of Cellmark’s statements, it is
difficult to conceive how those statements could be considered to be offered
for any other purpose.278
Justice Thomas, who joined the plurality’s holding but rejected its
reasoning, highlighted this flaw, stating “there was no plausible reason for
the introduction of Cellmark’s statements other than to establish their
truth.”279 Justice Thomas went on to refute the plurality’s suggestion that
such an approach would undermine longstanding historical practice with
respect to expert witnesses, noting that it was not until the Federal Rules of
Evidence were adopted in 1975 that “the universe of facts upon which an
expert could rely was expanded to include facts of the case that the expert
learned out of court by means other than his own perception.”280 Today, the
principal treatise on evidence calls the idea that “basis evidence” comes in
not for its truth, but only to help the fact-finder evaluate an expert’s
opinion, “very weak,” “factually implausible,” “nonsense,” and
“fictional.”281
To illustrate the logical shortcomings of the plurality’s position, the
dissent poses a hypothetical involving a lay witness rather than an expert.282
In this example, an eyewitness tells a police officer that the perpetrator had
an unusual star-shaped birthmark over his left eye.283 If the police officer
were to testify at trial about what the eyewitness told him, there would be
no doubt that the testimony would violate the Confrontation Clause unless
the eyewitness were unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity
to cross-examine her. The dissent then asks whether anything should
reliance is justified; inversely, if the jury doubts the accuracy or validity of the basis
evidence, it will be skeptical of the expert’s conclusions.”).
278
Indeed the trial court, in announcing its verdict, expressly concluded that the
defendant’s DNA matched the DNA in the semen recovered from the victim. Williams, 132
S. Ct. at 2258 n. 4. (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas correctly points out that
“[a]bsent other evidence, it would have been impossible for the trial court to reach that
conclusion without relying on the truth of Cellmark’s statement that its test results were
based on the semen from L.J.’s swabs.” Id.
279
Id. at 2256.
280
Id. at 2257. Prior to the adoption of the federal rules, “an expert could render an
opinion based only on facts that the expert had personally perceived or facts that the expert
learned at trial, either by listening to the testimony of other witnesses or through a
hypothetical question based on facts in evidence.” Id. Justice Thomas points out that in
such situations, “there was little danger that the expert would rely on testimonial hearsay . . .
because the expert and the witnesses on whom he relied were present at trial.” Id.
281
KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 277, § 4.10.1, at 196–98. “One can
sympathize with a court’s desire to permit the disclosure of basis evidence that is quite
probably reliable, such as a routine analysis of a drug, but to pretend that it is not being
introduced for the truth of its contents strains credibility.” Id.
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Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2269 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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change if the officer were to reword his testimony in the form of a
conclusion: “I concluded that [the defendant] was the assailant because a
reliable eyewitness told me that the assailant had a star-shaped birthmark
and, look, [the defendant] has one just like that.”284 Obviously, couching
the same testimony in the form of a conclusion would make no
constitutional difference because “[i]t remains the case that the prosecution
is attempting to introduce a testimonial statement that has no relevance to
the proceedings apart from its truth.”285
Even Justice Breyer, who joined in the plurality, wrote separately that
he was “willing to accept the dissent’s characterization of the present rule as
artificial,”286 leaving only three Justices clinging to the fiction that out-ofcourt statements relied upon by an expert witness in forming his conclusion,
when admitted at trial, are not being offered for the truth of the matter
asserted.
The plurality’s reasoning is also problematic because it would allow
prosecutors to easily circumvent the Sixth Amendment requirement. Where
the declarant of a testimonial assertion against the defendant is unavailable,
the government can avoid allowing the defendant to cross-examine the
declarant by simply calling an expert witness to testify to conclusions based
on the declarant’s findings. Suddenly, statements that would otherwise be
testimonial hearsay assertions against the defendant would become
“underlying facts and data,” so long as the government can demonstrate that
the testifying expert relied on the assertions to form her conclusions. The
testifying expert essentially becomes a conduit for testimonial hearsay
evidence.287
While the prosecutors in Williams may not have intentionally sought to
circumvent the Sixth Amendment requirement, that is effectively what
happened. Lambatos did not perform her own tests on the samples.288 She
merely “agreed with Cellmark’s results” and “made her own visual and
interpretive comparisons of [Cellmark’s report] . . . to conclude there was a
match to the defendant’s genetic profile.289 The process of actually
284

Id.
Id.
286
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2246 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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constructing the DNA profile was performed by Cellmark.290 According to
Lambatos, this process involved (1) isolating and extracting DNA from a
sample; (2) amplifying the extraction to form a more workable sample; (3)
measuring the length of an individual strand using a process called
electrophoresis; and (4) using a computer to translate this measurement into
a graph that represents the subject’s DNA.291 Lambatos did not perform or
supervise these processes.292 She could attest to little more than the fact
that Cellmark is an accredited lab and that she has never had a chain of
custody or contamination problem with them in the past.293 Justice
Freeman, who concurred in the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court,
wrote that “Lambatos’ opinion regarding whether Cellmark followed proper
guidelines at the time the DNA material was extracted and amplified was
not based on anything other than her rank speculation that it ‘had to have
been done’ solely because Cellmark was an accredited lab.”294 Justice
Freeman also noted that “Lambatos admitted that Cellmark used procedures
and standards that were different from those used by her own employer.”295
While she testified that she “helped develop . . . proficiency tests to be
administered to analysts at Cellmark,”296 “nothing in her testimony revealed
that the analysts who performed the DNA extraction and amplification in
this case had taken, let alone passed, the tests she had developed . . . .”297
Nor could she testify that Cellmark ran the tests on Williams’s sample in
accordance with the standards preferred by her employer, the ISP lab.298
This is troubling because without an opportunity to cross-examine the
lab analysts at Cellmark who actually constructed the DNA profile,
Williams’s counsel was unable to probe the credibility or expertise of those
analysts, or the veracity of the process employed in this particular test. The
prosecution had the opportunity to use the contents of the Cellmark report
to bolster its case against Williams, but Williams could not even delve into
whether Cellmark was accredited at the time the tests were performed. Nor
reading to match up the numbers generated on the computer charts, which was derived from
Cellmark’s underlying scientific processes.”).
290
Id. at 271 (majority opinion).
291
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292
See id. at 272.
293
Id.
294
Id. at 284 (Freeman, J., concurring). Justice Freeman ultimately joined the majority’s
holding despite the fact that he “believe[d] the circuit court abused its discretion by
admitting Lambatos’ testimony without proper foundation” because “the error . . . was
harmless.” Id. at 287.
295
Id.
296
Id.
297
Id.
298
Id.

2012]

SUMMARY EXHIBITS

893

was Williams able to ascertain whether the lab analysts who constructed
Williams’s DNA profile had passed the proficiency test developed by
Lambatos. By implying, as Justice Breyer does in his concurrence, that
“perception, memory, narration, and sincerity” are the primary targets of
cross-examination,299 the Court ignores the actual reasons a criminal
defendant might want to cross-examine a lab analyst—credibility and
competence. Because Lambatos had no definite knowledge of Cellmark’s
operations outside of the fact that it was an “accredited lab,” Williams’s
attorneys had no opportunity to expose any lapses on Cellmark’s part, ask
questions about Cellmark’s analysts’ proficiencies, or probe whether the
analysts at Cellmark had tested the wrong vial, mislabeled the samples, or
committed some other technical error.
The plurality’s reasoning also offends Crawford and its progeny in a
more fundamental way. It collapses the constitutional inquiry under the
Sixth Amendment into the evidentiary inquiry under FRE 703 (and
Illinois’s equivalent). The Court’s reasoning suggests that once the hearsay
hurdle has been overcome, the right of confrontation does not apply because
there is an evidentiary basis for admitting the testimony. Crawford and its
progeny make clear, however, that admissibility under the rules of evidence
does not automatically satisfy the constitutional right to confrontation.
Recognizing the plurality’s departure from the Court’s precedent, Justice
Thomas warned that the rules of evidence should not “so easily trump a
defendant’s confrontation right,” and reminded the Court that it has
“recognized that concepts central to the application of the Confrontation
Clause are ultimately matters of federal constitutional law that are not
dictated by state or federal evidentiary rules.”300 The dissent echoed, “we
do not typically allow state law to define federal constitutional
requirements.”301 While the rules governing expert testimony allow experts
to testify to evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay,302 it
does not follow that the Constitution allows the same without confrontation.
Crawford “made clear that the Confrontation Clause’s protections are not
coterminous with rules of evidence.”303
The remainder of the plurality’s reasoning is no sounder. The Court
goes on to hold that even if the Cellmark report were entered for its truth, it
would not be testimonial because a DNA report “bears little if any
resemblance to the historical practices that the Confrontation Clause aimed
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to eliminate.”304 In support of this argument, the plurality submits that the
Cellmark report is not testimonial because it was “not prepared for the
primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual.”305 The origins of this
test are unknown, even to the dissent.306 What it appears to be is a slightly
mutated version of the “primary purpose test” articulated in Davis—that a
statement offered against the accused is testimonial if the purpose of the
statement was to further an investigation for criminal prosecution.307 Thus,
the plurality ruled that the statements made against Williams were
admissible by injecting a new requirement that the individual against whom
the testimony is offered must have been specifically targeted for potential
prosecution at the time the statement was made. The plurality reasoned that
a lab analyst processing DNA before a suspect has been identified has little
motive to behave dishonestly.308 Again, this argument misses the point. As
the dissent notes, “the typical problem with laboratory analyses—and the
typical focus of cross-examination—has to do with careless or incompetent
work, rather than with personal vendettas. And as to that predominant
concern, it makes not a whit of difference whether, at the time of the
laboratory test, the police already have a suspect.”309
Lastly, the Court points to the following safeguards that it believes
would prevent prosecutors from abusing its expert carve-out to the
confrontation right: (1) the ability of trial courts to “screen out experts who
would act as mere conduits of hearsay by strictly enforcing the requirement
that experts display some genuine scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge that will help the trier of fact”;310 (2) the ability to “preclude[]
[experts] from disclosing inadmissible evidence to a jury”;311 (3) the use of
limiting instructions to explain to the jury that “out-of-court statements
cannot be accepted for their truth, and that an expert’s opinion is only as
good as the independent evidence that establishes its underlying
premises”;312 and (4) triers of fact may not give any weight to an expert’s
testimony “if the prosecution cannot muster any independent admissible
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evidence to prove the foundational facts that are essential to the relevance
of the expert’s testimony.”313
The court fails to explain how this is relevant to the Sixth Amendment
inquiry. The problem with this reasoning is that it attempts to safeguard the
reliability of expert testimony, but ignores the Court’s precedent that the
only constitutionally acceptable safeguard is Confrontation.314 Allowing
admissibility under the Sixth Amendment to turn on whether the court
believes cross-examination is necessary appears to be a throwback to the
very reasoning the Supreme Court has rejected since Crawford.315
Regardless of whether a court finds an expert’s testimony reliable, the Sixth
Amendment demands that “that reliability be assessed in a particular
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”316
B. WILLIAMS’S RELEVANCE TO THE SUMMARY EXHIBIT INQUIRY

Even assuming the Court’s fragile holding withstands the test of time,
it is hard to tell how Williams may impact the admissibility of summary
exhibits under the Confrontation Clause. Neither basis for the plurality’s
decision applies in the summary exhibit context. Summary exhibits, unlike
underlying facts relied upon by expert witnesses (according to the
plurality), are by definition offered to prove the truth of their contents. This
is what distinguishes summary exhibits under FRE 1006 from
demonstrative exhibits offered under FRE 611(a).317 Unless the Court were
to find a way to take its reasoning a step further, the expert testifying to a
summary exhibit could not present the contents of a summary exhibit under
the guise of “underlying facts and data.” The exhibit would have to be
entered into evidence, leaving a trial court to decide whether the maker of
the assertions contained within that statement should be cross-examined.
The second basis for the plurality’s decision—that even if admitted,
the Cellmark lab report is not testimonial—also does not apply squarely to
the case of summary exhibits. A summary exhibit created during an
investigation of a particular set of individuals with an eye toward possible
litigation—as may often be the case in the forensic accounting context—
313
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would survive the plurality’s modified primary purpose test. If the target of
the investigation is identified before or during the course of the
investigation, the plurality’s concerns with dishonesty, misreporting, and
intentionally faulty analysis would apply in full force. And of course, the
dissent’s concerns with incompetence, inexperience, and carelessness
would also apply.
Indeed, the grounds upon which the plurality attempted to distinguish
its holding from Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming suggest that Williams does
not preclude the exclusion of summary exhibits on confrontation grounds.
The Court stated that “in [Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming], the forensic
reports were introduced into evidence, and there is no question that this was
done for the purpose of proving the truth of what they asserted: in
Bullcoming that the defendant’s blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit
and in Melendez-Diaz that the substance in question contained cocaine.”318
The Court went on to explain that “nothing comparable happened” with the
Cellmark report because its relevance only became apparent after the
suspect had been arrested and his profile compared by the ISP lab.319 If this
is where the Court seeks to draw the line, then summary exhibits offered
against a criminal defendant seem to fall into the same category as
Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz.320
The ultimate determination of whether summary exhibits receive
constitutional scrutiny may turn on whether the Court finds the exhibit
sufficiently “formal” to constitute a testimonial statement.
V. CONCLUSION
Crawford and its progeny have fundamentally transformed our Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence.
Most of the Court’s post-Crawford
Confrontation Clause cases have focused on either fleshing out whether a
particular type of hearsay evidence is testimonial or determining whether
the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the appropriate witness
to guarantee his right to confrontation. This is not surprising in light of the
fact that Crawford’s most immediate effect was the separation of the
procedural right to confrontation from the substantive guarantees of
reliability and trustworthiness in FRE 803. However, the scope of
Crawford, especially in light of the Court’s decisions in Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming, should not be confined to its effect on the hearsay rule. It
318
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should also demand confrontation where other forms of testimonial
evidence are concerned, notwithstanding their admissibility under the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
Though FRE 1006 does not appear in the federal rules as a hearsay
exception, it allows for the admission of out-of-court statements being
offered for the truth of their contents. Such summaries are admissible
because: (1) they serve the practical purpose of allowing the proponent to
educate the jury on facts and evidence that would be too voluminous and
complex without a summary, and (2) the requirement that the underlying
voluminous information be admissible protects the opponent from the
admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence. However, the
differences between FRE 1006 and the hearsay exceptions should not be
considered relevant for confrontation purposes.
Testimonial summary exhibits, such as the one that would result from
the forensic accounting investigation described in Part II, are more than
mere recapitulations of voluminous data. They are statements that reflect
the subjective determinations and discretionary judgment exercised by an
investigator or forensic accountant. The accountant determines which
attributes are important, how the presence or absence of those attributes
should be determined, and how the information should be organized,
compiled, and presented in a compelling way. Each layer of subjective
interpretation and decisionmaking that goes into making this type of
summary removes it further from the underlying data. Refusing to allow a
defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the individual or individuals
who made the judgment calls reflected in such a summary would constitute
a deprivation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the
witnesses against him.
Under Crawford, the fact that a piece of evidence is categorically
admissible because the Federal Rules of Evidence deem that category of
evidence trustworthy and reliable does not obviate the defendant’s right to
cross-examine the proponent of that evidence if it is testimonial.321
Crawford and its progeny do not limit testimonial evidence to statements
that come from what most would consider traditional “witnesses” against a
defendant;322 instead, testimonial evidence can come from any individual
whose statement is being offered against a criminal defendant so long as
that statement satisfies Davis’s “primary purpose” test;323 the primary
321

Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 61, 68–69 (2004) (“[W]e decline to mine the record in search
of indicia of reliability. Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually
prescribes: confrontation.”).
322
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2009).
323
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
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purpose must be to “establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution.”324 Summary exhibits, like many hearsay
statements that fall within a “firmly-rooted” hearsay exception, fall into
both of these categories. Under Melendez-Diaz, they are deemed
admissible because the underlying voluminous information is admissible,
and they are prepared by witnesses for use against the accused. Under
modern Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, neither should be sufficient to
deprive the defendant of the right to confront the preparer of the statement
through cross-examination.
In most cases, a summary exhibit is offered by its proponent through
the testimony of a sponsoring witness. This witness may have prepared the
summary exhibit himself or, at the very least, would have a macrounderstanding of how the exhibit was derived from the underlying
voluminous information. However, oftentimes the witness who testifies is
someone other than the individual who performed the investigative work
that led to the creation of the summary. If subjective decisionmaking is
involved at the ground level, where the voluminous information is
analyzed, these decisions are usually made by subordinates of the testifying
witness who are not available for cross-examination by the defendant.
While this is not fatal to the admission of summary exhibits insofar as the
Federal Rules of Evidence are concerned, it raises serious constitutional
concerns in light of Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming.
The Court will undoubtedly have to address the issue of whether
testimonial summary exhibits, especially those that are created after the
preparer exercises significant judgment in order to get from the underlying
voluminous information to the summaries, are statements against a
defendant that require the defendant to have the opportunity to crossexamine the individual who prepared them. Williams v. Illinois has
muddied the Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, specifically with
respect to the intersection of the Sixth Amendment and rules of evidence.
The decision also offers few hints as to how the Court would decide a case
involving a testimonial summary exhibit admitted for the truth of its
contents. Regardless, however, summaries are independent statements that
exist apart from the underlying data, they are usually made with an eye
toward litigation, they are offered as substantive evidence if admitted under
Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, and they are often created after a potential
defendant has been targeted. Therefore, the dangers the Confrontation
Clause was designed to prevent apply in full force. For these reasons, if
and when faced with an appropriate case, the Court should hold that the
individual who made the decisions embodied in the summary exhibit should
324

Id.
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be made available for cross-examination in order to afford the defendant his
Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.
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